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4. JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred upon this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)( j), in that this is an 
appeal from the District Court involving the conviction of 
Appellant of Aggravated Burglary, a felony in the first degree, 
which was assigned to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court on 
November 2, 1992. 
5. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) 
rendered below on August 17, 1992 and entered below on August 25, 
1992 by the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Judge David S. 
Young, presiding. The judgment appealed from is the conviction, 
following trial by jury, of Appellant of Aggravated Burglary, a 
first degree felony, as well as the sentence of five years to life 
which was imposed by the court following the conviction. 
6. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the court reversibly err when it failed to properly 
instruct the jury as to the possibility of convicting Allison 
Peterson of lesser, but included, offenses? 
The standard by which the appellate court's review the failure 
of a court to give a "lesser included offense" jury instruction 
when requested by the Defendant is to determine whether or not the 
evidence presented at trial, given any reasonable view, would 
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support a verdict on the lesser included offense. If the evidence 
would support such a verdict, and the Defendant requested such an 
instruction, the trial court commits reversible error when it 
declines to give such a jury instruction. See State v. Baker, 671 
P.2d 152, 154-57 (Utah 1983). 
II. Did the trial court reversibly err when it excluded 
proffered statements by witnesses as hearsay, when the proffered 
testimony was proffered to attack the State's witnesses' 
credibility, and to bolster the credibility of the Defendant. 
The standard of review of this issue is that the exclusion of 
evidence is harmless error unless the excluded evidence would 
probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a 
different verdict. See Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. 
Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1303-1304 (Utah 1987). 
III. Did the trial court improperly prejudice or bias the 
jury by its treatment of, and conduct towards Appellant and her 
counsel during trial. 
The standard of review applicable to this issue is whether or 
not the trial court's conduct or comments were prejudicial to the 
rights of the Defendant and to the outcome of the trial. See State 
v. Sanchez, 611 P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 1980). 
IV. Did the trial court reversibly err when it relied upon 
allegations and statements from a letter from Mr. Peterson and a 
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"Victim Impact Statement", in imposing a sentence in this matter, 
where such allegations and statements were not presented at trial, 
were not in evidence at trial, were not provided to Defendant, and 
where Defendant was not given an opportunity to present contrary 
evidence or to have a hearing and cross-examine or otherwise test 
the validity and credibility of the out-of-court, hearsay 
statements. 
This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
See State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1978). 
7. DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Appellant cites the following statutes and rules as being 
determinative of at least a portion of the issues presented for 
review. Addendum F contains a reproduction of their full text: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203; 
Utah R. Evid. 801 
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8. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) 
rendered on August 17, 1992, and entered on August 25, 1992 by the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Judge David S. Young, 
presiding. The Judgment appealed from is the conviction of 
Appellant, following a two-day jury trial, of the offense of 
Aggravated Burglary, a first degree felony. The Appellant's 
sentence of five years to life, which was imposed by the trial 
court following the conviction is also appealed. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Review is sought from the Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) 
entered on August 25, 1992, against Appellant, by the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable David S. Young, 
District Judge, presiding. No post-trial motions were filed under 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure pertaining to review of, or 
relief from, the trial court's judgment. 
Following the entry of the Judgment and Sentence in the trial 
court, Appellant was sentenced by the trial court to incarceration 
in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate period of five years 
to life imprisonment. Appellant has been incarcerated since the 
time of the jury's verdict, and remains incarcerated at the Utah 
State Women's Correctional Facility in Draper, Utah. 
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On September 2, 1992, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal, 
which is the instant appeal. This appeal was subsequently 
"powered-over" by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
On September 2, 1992, Appellant filed a Request for 
Transcript, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(1). On November 10, 
1992, Appellant filed, with the trial court, a motion for Court 
Order requiring payment of transcription costs on appeal, and an 
Affidavit of Impecuniosity in support of her motion. 
On December 21, 1992, after the filing of an objection to 
Defendant's Motion by the State and the filing of a reply by the 
Defendant, the trial court held a hearing on Defendant's motion. 
Following the hearing on Defendant's Motion, the court, on December 
23, 1992, made and entered its Order denying Defendant's Motion for 
Order requiring payment of transcription costs on appeal. 
On January 21, 1993, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal from 
the trial court's transcription payment order. This appeal was 
summarily decided by the Court of Appeals on April 29, 1993, 
wherein the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's finding and 
remanded for a evidentiary determination of counsel's pro bono 
status. Following filings and a hearing and the submission of 
further documentation, on August 27, 1993, the trial court entered 
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an Order providing for the provision of a transcript at State 
expense to the Appellant and her current counsel of record. 
The course of this appeal was stayed by the Utah Court of 
Appeals on April 5, 1993 pending a determination of Appellant's 
appeal on the transcript issue. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL 
This matter was tried to a jury in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
David S. Young presiding on July 7 and 8, 1992. Following the 
instructing of the jury and its deliberations, the jury returned 
a verdict of guilty as charged to the Information charge against 
Appellant of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony. 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellant Allison Peterson (hereinafter referred to as 
"Appellant") was married to Leon Peterson. (Tr. Trans., Vol. II, 
p. 422). 
2. On July 17, 1991, Appellant filed a Complaint in the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, seeking a divorce 
from Leon Peterson, and seeking full custody of their minor 
daughter. (Id., p. 426). 
3. On or about April 14, 1992, Leon Peterson's home was 
broken into by three individuals. During the break in, in the 
process of protecting himself from the intruders, Leon Peterson 
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shot and killed one of the intruders. (Tr. Trans., Vol. II, pp. 
242-244). 
4. On April 15, 1992, Appellant was arrested and 
subsequently charged by way of Information with Aggravated 
Burglary, a first degree felony. (R.8). 
5. The Amended Information filed against Appellant charges 
that she, "as a party to the offense, in attempting, committing, 
or fleeing from a burglary, the actors or another participant in 
the crime used or threatened immediate use of a dangerous weapon 
against a person who was not a participant in the crime...". 
(R.8A-9). 
6. Following a Preliminary Hearing before the Third Circuit 
Court, Salt Lake County, J. Reese, presiding, on May 5, 1992, 
Appellant was bound over to the District Court for trial on the 
Aggravated Burglary charge. (R.2). 
7. On June 29, 1992, Appellant, through her counsel, 
submitted her requested jury instructions to the Court. Appellant 
requested that the jury be instructed that it could find her not 
guilty of the crime charged, but guilty of any one of several 
lesser included crimes. (R.62). 
8. Commencing on July 7, 1992, Appellant was tried, before 
a jury, on the charges against her based upon the Information. 
(R.62). 
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9. The trial was conducted on July 7, 1992 and continued to 
July 8, 1992. (R.97). 
10. On July 8, 1993, Ms. Melissa Scharrier was called to 
testify on Appellant's behalf at trial. (Tr. Trans./ Vol. II, p. 
378). 
11. During Ms. Scharrierfs direct testimony/ Appellant's 
trial counsel began asking Ms. Scharrier questions relating to 
conversations she had overheard at her place of employment between 
Appellant and Ms. Kandi Mlynar. (Id., p. 380). 
12. At the beginning of this questioning, after objection by 
the State, and after a proffer outside of the hearing of the jury, 
the Court excluded all testimony to be offered by Ms. Scharrier 
regarding conversations and statements made by Ms. Kandi Mlynar. 
(Id., p. 385). 
13. On July 8, 1993, Ms. Paula Ring was called to testify on 
Appellant's behalf at trial. (Id., p. 392). 
14. During Ms. Ring's direct testimony, Appellant's trial 
counsel began asking Ms. Ring questions relating to conversations 
she overheard at her place of employment between Appellant 
and Ms. Kandi Mlynar. (Id., p. 393). 
15. At the beginning of this questioning, after objection by 
the State, the Court excluded all testimony to be offered by Ms. 
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Ring regarding conversations and statements made by Ms. Mlynar. 
(Id., p. 394). 
16. On July 8, 1992, during the examination and testimony of 
Appellant, then being conducted by her attorney, Earl S. Spafford, 
Appellant stated that someone was making faces at her through the 
courtroom door window. (Id., p. 411). 
17. At the time of this statement, Mr. Spafford turned toward 
the door, and then informed the Court that he had seen Mr. Leon 
Peterson outside the courtroom door window. (Id.). 
18. The Court instructed the Bailiff to lecture the witnesses 
outside the courtroom (sequestered from the trial by the 
exclusionary rule) regarding proper decorum. (Id.). 
19. After Mr. Spafford had resumed his questioning of 
Appellant, the Court interrupted the proceedings and in the 
presence of the jury, stated that the Court had been watching the 
door the entire time, and that the Court did not see anyone looking 
in or making faces through the window. (Id., p. 425). 
20. On July 8, 1992, during the prosecutor's closing argument 
to the jury, Mr. Spafford leaned over to his co-counsel, E. Neal 
Gunnarson, at counsel table, and whispered regarding trial 
strategy. (Id., p. 579). 
21. Upon seeing this, the Court interrupted Mr. Stott's 
argument and reprimanded Mr. Spafford and instructed that there 
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were to be no further comments or discussion during closing 
arguments. (Id., p. 579). 
22. After the close of evidence and argument, and following 
a discussion in Chambers between the Court and counsel for both 
parties, the jury was called back to be instructed. (Id., p. 541). 
23. Over the objections of defense counsel, the Court refused 
to give any of the lesser included offense instructions, other than 
an instruction regarding conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary. 
(Id., pp. 537-541, R. 131). 
24. On July 8, 1992, after being instructed and retiring to 
deliberate, the jury returned a verdict against Appellant of guilty 
to the charge of aggravated burglary. (R. 134). 
25. On July 8, 1992, before committing Appellant to the Salt 
Lake County Jail to await sentencing, the Court set August 17, 1992 
as the date for the sentencing hearing. (Tr. Trans., Vol. II, p. 
594). 
26. Prior to sentencing Allison Peterson on August 17, 1992, 
the Court received a letter from Mr. Peterson and a Victim's Impact 
Statement, which it considered as part of, or along with the pre-
sentence report. (Sent. Tr., p. 13). 
27. The Victim Impact Statememt. in pertinent part, states 
as follows: 
"The victims of this offense are Leon 
Peterson and his daughter, Lauren. Mr. 
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Peterson reported he and his daughter 
have been receiving counseling as a re-
sult of the offense. He related his 
daughter was awake in an upstairs room 
during the offense and heard the noises. 
Mr. Peterson states that the subject is 
"incredibly vindictive" and he expressed 
a fear for his safety at such time as she 
is released from jail or prison. Leon 
Peterson said on three occasions prior to 
the current offense, the defendant 
attempted to cause him physical harm. He 
also related a history of abuse and on the 
part of the offender toward his daughter. 
This abuse was reported to have begun in 
July of 1991 and has included Lauren suffer-
ing a broken jaw." 
28. No opportunity to object or present evidence countering 
the information in the Victim Impact Statement was ever afforded 
Allison Peterson or her counsel. (Sent. Trans., pp. 12-17). 
29. The statements of Leon Peterson contained in the Victim 
Impact Statement are completely unfounded, unsubstantiated and 
false. 
30. On August 17, 1992, Allison Peterson was sentenced by the 
Court to incarceration in the Utah State Prison for a period of 
five years to life imprisonment. (R. 139, 140). 
9. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant's arguments on appeal are fourfold. First, 
Appellant argues that she should be granted a new trial and the 
jury verdict below vacated because the jury was improperly 
instructed regarding its opportunity to review and consider the 
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evidence in light of jury instructions permitting a finding of 
guilt of lesser, but included offenses in the principal offense 
charged. Appellant was charged with being a party to an Aggravated 
Burglary which occurred on April 14, 1992. Despite evidence that 
entry was never made by the perpetrators of the alleged burglary 
into the home, the trial court refused to give instructions to the 
jury that took the ambiguity as to entry into account, and only 
gave jury instructions regarding the principal offense charged and 
a conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary instruction. No 
instructions which did not presuppose entry were given, despite the 
objection and proffer of such instructions by Appellant. 
Following the close of trial, and during the deliberations of 
the jury, it has become known to Appellant's counsel that the jury 
was confused as to the difference between being a party to an 
offense and being a conspirator in planning an offense. 
On July 8, 1992, the jury foreperson wrote a note to the court 
inquiring as to the difference between being a party and being a 
conspirator and was told by the court by return correspondence that 
there was no difference. This effectively destroyed the effect of 
the lesser included instruction given as to conspiracy and gave the 
jury only a choice between guilty as charged and acquittal. 
Failure of the court to properly instruct the jury compounded by 
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the court's erroneous definition of the law in its ex parte 
correspondence to the jury was reversible error. 
Appellant's next argument for the vacation of her conviction 
is that the Court improperly excluded testimony of co-workers which 
was proffered to impeach the credibility of the State's witness. 
The proffered testimony is outside the scope of the hearsay rule 
and was proffered only to impeach the testimony of Ms. Kandi 
Mlynar. 
The court improperly excluded this testimony, which left the 
jury with the distinct impression that the only witnesses to 
believe were the State's witnesses. This was compounded by the 
next issue raised by Appellant on appeal, and when combined, 
creates a substantial prejudice as to Appellant's rights to a fair 
trial. 
The third issue raised on appeal is that after the court had 
excluded all testimony which could have impeached the credibility 
of the State's witness, the court attacked the credibility of both 
Appellant and her counsel through comments made during a series of 
irregular occurrences involving persons looking through courtroom 
door windows. After the Appellant, during her testimony, stated 
that someone was making faces at her through the courtroom window, 
and Appellant's counsel stated that he saw Appellant's ex-husband 
outside the doors, the court later stated in the presence of the 
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jury that he had been watching the windows all day, and that no one 
had been making faces, and that Mr. Peterson was not making faces, 
thus impugning the credibility of both Appellant and her counsel. 
In addition, the court made other comments directed toward the 
credibility of Appellant's counsel and representation, which 
combined in an overall influence on the jury to create the distinct 
impression that the court was of the opinion that Appellant lacked 
credibility. 
The final issue Appellant cites on appeal is the Court's error 
in considering Appellant's ex-husband's statements and submissions 
in a letter to the court, as well as comments in a Victim Impact 
Statement when sentencing Appellant. Appellant was never provided 
specific copies of the Victim Impact Statement nor was she ever 
made aware that Mr. Peterson had contacted the court and submitted 
information to him outside the scope of the judicial process. 
The combined effect of this surprise was that once Appellant 
and her counsel had finished their presentation to the court, the 
court berated Appellant, citing the extrajudicial comments of Mr. 
Peterson of which Appellant had no knowledge at that time, thus 
denying Appellant any opportunity to seek a sentencing hearing or 
evidentiary hearing to test the validity of Mr. Peterson's comments 
and submissions. This reliance on extrajudicial, unfounded 
statements by Mr. Peterson denied Appellant any effective 
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opportunity to be heard at her sentencing and consequently, her 
sentence should also be overturned. 
10. DETRIL OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I • THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO 
PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING 
LESSER, INCLUDED OFFENSES. 
On June 29, 1992, Appellant submitted her requested jury 
instructions to the Court. (R. 62-64). Among the jury 
instructions requested prior to trial, Appellant submitted to the 
Court requested jury instructions regarding the availability of a 
jury verdict on crimes which are lesser than the crime charged of 
Aggravated Burglary, but which are included in the principal 
offense. (R. 83-84). The lesser included offenses upon which the 
Appellant requested the jury be instructed were Attempted 
Aggravated Burglary, a second degree felony, (R. 86); Burglary 
(involving a dwelling), a second degree felony (R. 87); Attempted 
Burglary, a third degree felony, (R. 88); Criminal Tresspass, 
either a Class B Misdemeanor, or an infraction, (R. 89-90); and 
Attempted Criminal Tresspass, or an infraction, (R. 91). See also 
the requested jury verdict form (R. 92-93). 
On July 7, 1992, in his direct testimony at trial, Mr. 
Kerry Shane Soper testified that after he and three other young men 
arrived at Mr. Leon Peterson's house, Appellant and Ms. Kandi 
Mlynar left the immediate vicinity and went to a convenience store 
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in the proximity. (Tr. Trans., Vol. I, pp. 192-193). The three 
other young men are identified in the transcript as J.J., Jason and 
John. (Tr. Trans., Vol. I, pp. 193-194). Mr. Soper testified that 
the only person who he thought entered the Peterson home was J.J. 
(Trial Transcript, Vol. I., pp. 199-200). The specific testimony 
at trial by Mr. Soper was: 
Q. What did J.J. do? 
A. Kicked the door. 
Q. With his foot? 
A. Yes, and his body. 
Q. How hard? 
A. Very hard. 
Q. What did he do then? 
A. He got about a foot inside the door and three shots were 
fired instantly. 
• • • 
Q. Did you see their effect? 
A. I heard J.J. moan as soon as they had been fired. 
Q* How close were you at this time to J.J.? 
A. Within four or five feet. 
Q. Had you gone inside? 
A. No, I had not. 
Q. Just 3.3.7 
A. Just J.J. 
16 
(Tr. Trans., Vol. I, p. 199, lines 16-24, p. 200, lines 14-21). 
On July 8, 1992, Mr. Soper testified, on cross-examination, 
that J.J. knocked on the door (Tr. Trans., Vol. II, p. 224, lines 
3-4), that Mr. Peterson opened the door approximately six inches 
(Id., lines 5-8), that he (Mr. Soper) did not enter the Peterson 
home (_Id., lines 12-19), that he only remembered three shots being 
fired (Jjd., p. 225, lines 1-2) and that after he was shot, J.J. 
fell outside of the door, on the porch. (.Id., lines 3-10). 
On July 8, 1992, Mr. Leon Peterson was was called to testify 
at trial on behalf of the State in its prosecution of Appellant. 
When he testified about the occurrences of the evening and night 
of April 14-15, 1992, Mr. Peterson testified that he was awakened 
at 12:00 a.m. on the morning of April 15, 1993 by his doorbell 
ringing, (Tr. Trans., Vol. II, p. 267, lines 18-25). He got up and 
began going downstairs, towards the home's kitchen. (Id. p. 268). 
On the way downstairs, he took a gun out of his closet. (Id., 
lines 21-25). After waiting downstairs for a few moments, he heard 
a soft knock on the kitchen's exterior door. (Id., p. 269, lines 
23-25). Mr. Peterson answered the door, and got it open about six 
inches when, he testified, a "guy" kicked the door from the outside 
and entered the Peterson home. (.Id., p. 272, lines 1-16). Mr. 
Peterson then testified that the man who kicked the door came 
inside the home, along with another man, and approached Ms. 
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Peterson menacingly with baseball bats. (^ Ld., pp. 272-273). Mr. 
Peterson then testified that he fired at the first entrant, who 
was, at that time, two or three feet inside the house. (^ d., p. 
274, lines 11-13). Mr. Peterson then testified that the man, after 
being shot, kept coming (Id., lines 17-18). Mr. Peterson then 
stated: 
...I was very scared and I was very reluctant 
to raise the pistol up til I seen the bat. 
And I still I kept shooting and he kept 
coming. And I stopped and he kept coming. 
And when I got to the stairs and he was still 
going up towards the Bab towards the baby's 
room, I fired two more times. The last time 
I fired he stopped and stood up very straight 
and made a very loud girgle [sic]... 
He turned around, faced back out towards the 
door and took maybe a couple of steps and fell 
face forward." 
(Id. p. 275, lines 1-11). Mr. Peterson testified that the wounded 
man "landed towards the door, and his top part of him fell out of 
the door. His legs were still inside the house." (Id., lines 13-
15). The wounded person was Jasson Dorman who died of the wounds 
inflicted by Mr. Peterson (Id., pp. 243-244). 
As the Court of Appeals is well aware, one of the critical 
elements of the crime of Burglary is the requirement that the 
actor "enter or remain unlawfully in a building or any portion of 
a building." Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202(1) (1953, as amended). The 
testimony of Mr. Soper and Mr. Peterson puts the decedent, Jasson 
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Dorman, in the home, thus fulfilling the statutory element of entry 
required for a conviction of Burglary. 
However, there is conflicting testimony which shows that it 
is possible, if not likely, that the required "entry" never 
occurred. 
On July 8, 1993, Sgt. Jon Wood of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office was called as a witness at trial by the State. 
Sgt. Wood testified that upon his arrival at the Peterson home on 
the night in question, he observed an individual, later made known 
to him as the decedent, Jasson Dorman, "lying outside the north 
door of the residence in the driveway\carport area." (Tr. Trans., 
Vol. II, p.243, lines 13-15) [emphasis added]. Sgt. Wood also 
testified that a bat was found alongside the decedent, in the 
carport area. (Id. p. 245, lines 18-23). On cross-examination. 
Sgt. Wood testified that the only bloodstains he could remember 
were outside of the home, in the carport. (W., p. 248, lines 23-
25) [emphasis added]. Sgt. Wood further testified that he didn't 
"recall seeing any" blood inside the kitchen. (_Id., p. 249, lines 
15-18). 
On July 8, 1993, Detective Manfred Lassig of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office was called to testify on behalf of the 
State in its presentation of its case against Appellant. Detective 
Lassig was assigned to investigate the death of Jasson Dorman, and 
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conducted the investigation of the crime scene. On cross-
examination, Det. Lassig testified as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. Gunnarson) You went to the scene, the 
crime scene that night? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you go inside the house? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you see any blood stains? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Were there any blood stains in the kitchen? 
A. Not that I observed, no. 
Q. Were there any blood stains on the door jam of the back 
door? 
A. Not that I recall, no. 
Q. Do you recall any blood stains at all? 
A. Outside the—right outside the back door there was a 
significant amount. 
Q. Outside the door? Nothing inside the house? 
A. Not that I recall, no. 
Q. You have been involved in investigating homicides before? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. You are familiar with, are you, investigate cases of 
persons who have been shot? 
A. Yes, I have. 
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Q. Are you familiar with the type of wound that this 
individual suffered this night? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In your opinion would he have started to bleed 
immediately upon being shot? 
A. Yes, he would. 
Q. Did you look at the wound or were you close enough to see 
the body on this occasion or any time after? 
A. Afterwards, Yes. Up at the autopsy, he was not there 
when I arrived at the scene. 
Q. Pretty big hole? 
A. There were some larger wounds but they were not out of 
the ordinary, extremely large, no. 
Q. But they would have been such that in your opinion had 
he been shot in the kitchen it would have bled in the 
kitchen; is that right? 
A. There's a possibility had he been inside. Had he been 
in the doorway, I don't know. 
Q. He would have bled when he was shot. 
A. He would have—bleeding would have started when you're 
shot, yes. 
(Tr. Trans., Vol. II, p. 308, line 25 - p. 311, line 14). 
The standard of appropriate instruction of juries in criminal 
trials, as ennunciated by the Utah Supreme Court, is to determine 
whether the evidence presented at trial, given any reasonable view, 
would support a verdict on a lesser included offense. If the trial 
evidence, given any reasonable view would support such a verdict, 
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and the defendant requested such an instruction, yet the court 
declined to give such an instruction, the court's denial to give 
the requested instruction is reversible error. See State v. Baker, 
671 P.2d 152, 154-57 (Utah 1983). 
Appellant asked for several lesser included offense 
instructions on June 29, 1992, as cited above. At the time of 
trial, Mr. Gunnarson, Appellant's trial co-counsel, also asked for 
an instruction on the lesser included offenses of conspiracy to 
commit aggravated assault, aggravated assault, simple assault and 
conspiracy to commit simple assault. (Tr. Trans., Vol. II, p. 537, 
lines 12-21). The basis advanced at trial by Appellant for the 
lesser included instructions was that, given any reasonable view 
of the evidence, the testimony of Sgt. Wood and Det. Lassig can at 
least show no entry by Jasson Dorman occurred into the Peterson 
home. This, combined with Mr. Soper's testimony that Jasson was 
the only person who he thought could have entered the home, would 
support a verdict on any number of the lesser included offenses for 
which jury instructions were requested. Mr. Gunnarson further 
propounded the basis of the requests for lesser included offense 
instructions as follows: 
To show that there was entry into the house. 
This is based upon our reading of the Transcript, 
which has been authenticated, by John Clayton, 
in which, at two times at least, he's indicated 
that entry was not made. On Page 4, the answer, 
"we knocked and he opened the door. 
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"QUESTION: He knocked—you knocked on the door? 
You knocked and he . . . so in other words, he was 
kind of . . . he was expecting ya? 
"ANSWER: Yeah. It was just like we were kind 
of set up. Because he opened up the door, looked 
at J.J. and fired." 
Further down, next question, "You guys pushed 
the door open. ANSWER: I don't know, I had 
my back turned." Going on, "so you didn't see 
if anybody pushed the door open? "ANSWER: No, 
I didn't." In direct conflict to his testimony 
before the jury. And I think the jury's entitled 
to decide whether he went in or not. 
Judge Young: Okay. Now, for the record, you 
are reading from a statement that was an 
interview between that witness, Johnson, was it? 
Mr. Gunnarson: John Clayton. 
Judge Young: John Clayton. The witness John Clayton. 
His interview with a police officer which was not 
under oath and not in any Court proceeding, is that 
correct? 
Mr. Gunnarson: Correct. And one that he authenticated 
as a statement that he gave. 
Judge Young: All right. And in these proceedings he 
indicated that that testimony was inaccurate, that, 
in fact, they had gone in. 
Mr. Gunnerson: Exactly. While he— 
Judge Young: While he was under oath in these proceedings. 
Mr. Gunnarson: All right. But at the same time it's 
for the jury to decide whether he is lying then or now, 
because he was incorrect at one time or the other. We 
suggest the fact he is under oath isn't that significant. 
Judge Young: Okay. 
Mr. Gunnarson: Going on Page 5. "You guys pushed the 
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door open. I don't know, I had my back turned." We 
suggest, your Honor, that there is enough question there 
that a reasonable mind would not be able to distinguish 
without some discussion exactly what happened. And by 
precluding the jury from saying, in effect, that entrance 
was not made, and precluding consideration there, 
therefore, of the lesser included, is improper. 
We'd move the Court at this time to include those 
and if the Court decides to stay with its ruling 
we would just ask the record note our objection. 
Judge Young: All right. Does the State wish to comment? 
Mr. Stott: No, your Honor, other than to say, as you 
read those transcripts that was taken that evening 
I don't believe that stands for what counsel has said 
it stands for. 
Judge Young: All right. I believe that the testimony 
shows the Court that all of the witnesses have 
testified consistently throughout these proceedings 
that there waas entry, the victim, Mr. Peterson, testified 
that there was entry, he testified that J.J. got four to 
six feet in the house. In fact, there was some difference 
between whether it was four and up to potentially as much 
as ten feet into the house as he was shot. 
Each of the other witnesses testified that J.J. entered, 
and all of them testified that he entered by kicking the 
door and forcing his way in. Anything to conclude that he 
had not entered the house, I believe, there's no evidence 
that could sustain that. There is only the limited comment 
made in the interview that you've just referred to and just 
read, but it's simply not credible. And the witness 
testified here that he denied it. 
So based upon that I find that there is no basis that 
reasonable minds could differ on the issue of entry. 
Mr. Gunnarson: May I just have the record for one more 
moment and indicate, your Honor, that there is so much 
conflict in the testimony whether there's entry through 
the door or not that the question, that is a question 
for the jury to determine that. 
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Judge Young: But there's no—the entry, as you well know, 
under the law, requires just simple passage over the 
barrier of the house which means, potentially, inches 
across the threshold, if that. And there is no witness 
that has testified that was there that night that knew 
the facts, that testified that there was no entry. Every 
witness has testified there was entry. And it is 
absolutely inconsistent with the fact situation as 
to what happened, where the victim was found, and so on, 
of the shooting, for the Court to conclude anything other 
than that there was entry by the foot, by the pressure 
against the door, and by the testimony of the other 
witnesses. So I find no credible testimony. I think 
reasonable minds could absolutely not differ on the basis 
of the issue that you raise as to whether there was a 
question of entry. On that basis I denied those jury 
instructions. 
(Tr. Trans., Vol. II, p. 538, line 1 - p. 541, line 22). 
At the conclusion of trial, the Court gave a jury instruction 
on the offense of Aggravated Burglary (R. 117-119), as well as an 
instruction as to the definitions of the elements of the crime. 
(R. 121). The trial court also gave the jury an instruction as to 
the possibility of convicting Appellant of the lesser included 
offense of Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Burglary, a second 
degree felony. (R. 125). Despite the evidence at trial and the 
testimony of Det. Lassig and Sgt. Wood, as well as the preliminary 
hearing testimony of John Clayton, the Court refused to give any 
instruction as to any of the requested lesser included offenses 
which did not include, as an element of the offense, the physical 
entry into the Peterson home. 
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Not only was the trial evidence supportive of Appellant's 
argument that entry into the home never occurred, but the jury 
instructions which were given clearly left the jury with the 
impression that the matter of entry had already been determined. 
In addition, the error of giving only the conspiracy lesser 
included instruction was compounded when, on July 8, 1992, during 
deliberations, it appears the jury foreperson wrote a note to the 
Court, asking "what is the difference between being a "party" to 
the crime (she didn't enter the property) and being a conspirator?" 
(R. 132). To which the Court replied "There is no difference." 
(R. 132). This is clear error, in that being a party to the crime 
means the actor "acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of the offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense 
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct." Utah Code 
Ann. §76-2-202 (1953, as amended). However, conspiracy is defined 
as when an actor, "intending that conduct constituting a crime be 
performed, agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause 
the performance of such conduct, and anyone of them commits an 
overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy." Utah Code Ann. §76-4-
201. In addition to the error as to legal definitions, by telling 
the jury that there is no difference between being a "party" to an 
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offense and conspiracy, the court, sua sponte, took away the lone 
lesser included offense instruction that was given. 
Of critical importance when instructing a jury is a trial 
court's duty to impartially and completely instruct the jury as to 
the law upon which they are to decide the facts of the case, and 
the fate of the criminal defendant. 
When the Supreme Court enunciated the standards applicable 
for giving lesser included offense instructions in State v. Baker, 
671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), it quoted with approval the language of 
the United States Supreme Court: 
[I]t has long been recognized that [the 
lesser included offense] can also be beneficial 
to the defendant because it affords the jury 
a less drastic alternative than the choice 
between conviction of the offense charged and 
acquittal. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 
633 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2388, 65 L.Ed. 2d 392, 
— (1980). 
Baker, supra, 671 P.2d at 156. The Supreme Court went on to hold 
that "By having the jury instructed regarding a lesser included 
offense, the defendant is afforded the full benefit of the 
reasonable doubt standard. Baker, supra, 671 P.2d at 156. The 
Utah Supreme Court then quoted, again with approval, the United 
States Supreme Court's language from Keeble v. United States, 412 
U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973), as follows: 
...Where one of the elements of the 
offense charged remains in doubt, but the 
defendant is plainly guilty of some 
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offense, the jury is likely to resolve its 
doubts in favor of conviction. Keeble, 
supra, 412 U.S. at 212-13, 93 S. Ct. at 
1997-98 (emphasis as original). 
Baker, supra, 671 P.2d at 157. Thus, to avoid the lessening of the 
reasonable doubt standard of proof necessary for criminal 
conviction, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that where any reasonable 
view of the evidence would support a conviction of a lesser 
included offense, and one of the elements of the principal crime 
charged remains in evidentiary doubt, the giving of lesser included 
offense jury instructions is required if sought by the defendant. 
Baker, supra, 671 P.2d at 157. 
[W]here proof of an element of the crime 
is in dispute, the availability of the "third 
option" - the choice of conviction of a lesser 
offense rather than conviction of the greater 
or acquittal - gives the defendant the benefit 
of the reasonable doubt standard. 
Baker, supra, 671 P.2d at 157. 
At trial, the court deprived the jury of this option, and 
deprived Appellant of the full benefit of the reasonable doubt 
standard, when it refused to give any lesser included offense 
instruction which would have arisen from evidentiary questions as 
to whether or not an entry occurred. Because of the demonstrated 
evidentiary and testimonial ambiguities as to entry, this 
presupposition of the element of entry by the court was error, and 
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its refusal to instruct the jury on any of the requested lesser 
includeds which did not require the element of entry was error. 
The court's jury instruction errors and deprivation of 
Appellant's rights to a full measure of the reasonable doubt 
standard was compounded and exaggerated when the court, in answer 
to a written question from the jury, informed the jury that there 
is no difference between being a party to a crime and being a 
conspirator. See R. 132. This not only deprived Appellant of fair 
jury deliberations, but also confused the jury and destroyed the 
value of the lone lesser included instruction that was given. The 
court's instructing of, and correspondence with the jury brought 
into fateful reality the Utah Supreme Court's fears as ennunciated 
in Baker. When faced with a single lesser included offense, which 
the court itself later told the jury was the same as the principal 
offense charged, and when faced with the tragic death of young 
Jasson Dorman, the jury apparently could not bear to acquit 
Appellant, and so returned with the only verdict left to it, guilty 
as charged. 
The evidence, given a reasonable view, could have established 
that an entry into the Peterson home did not occur. Lack of entry 
means no burglary occurred. However, because of the court's jury 
instruction errors, the jury was faced with returning a jury 
verdict of guilty as charged or not guilty.. The death of Jasson 
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Dorman made the establishment of an acquittal remote. The jury was 
prevented from full and fair deliberations because of the lack of 
full jury instructions. In addition, through an undisclosed 
correspondence with the jury, the court confused the jury, and 
effectively destroyed the meaning of the single lesser included 
instruction the jury was given. The court erred, and Appellant 
should be granted a new trial. 
POINT 2: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY 
EXCLUDED EVIDENCE. 
Appellant's argument on appeal regarding the exclusion of 
certain prof erred witness testimony is made in conjunction with her 
arguments advanced regarding improper comments and observations 
made by the Court during trial which, when compounded and observed 
together, could only have left the jury with the distinct 
impression that the Court had already determined Appellant was not 
to be believed, and the State's witnesses were the only credible 
witnesses to testify at trial. 
In Appellant's trial, the State's proof of motive and of 
Appellant's alleged participation in planning the burglary of Mr. 
Peterson's house largely rested on the testimony of Appellant's co-
workers regarding their remembrances of conversations held at 
Appellant's place of employment between approximately early March 
through mid-April of 1992. 
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At the time of Appellant's trial, the State's witness, Kandi 
Mlynar, was allowed to testify on several occasions that she had 
had, or overheard, conversations with Appellant wherein Appellant 
allegedly talked about: different ways to harm Mr. Peterson (Tr. 
Trans., Vol. I, p.20); wanting any harm brought to Mr. Peterson to 
look gang related (^d.); wanting Mr. Peterson harmed because he had 
taken everything from her (^Ld., p.21); wanting to know if Ms. 
Mlynar knew anyone who could hurt Mr. Peterson (Id.); wanting to 
know whether or not Ms. Mlynar had found anyone yet. (_Id., p. 26); 
wanting Mr. Peterson to learn a lesson and wanting Mr. Peterson to 
get killed so that she (Appellant) could have custody of her 
daughter and receive life insurance proceeds. (Id., p. 27). 
Ms. Mlynar also testified that on April 14, 1992, Appellant 
approached Ms. Mlynar at approximately noon and told Ms. Mlynar 
that "tonight's the night, you know, today's the day, were going 
tonight." (Tr. Trans., Vol. I, p.35, lines 15-16). The obvious 
inference to the jury at this time, following all of the testimony 
that had gone before, was that Appellant had decided that April 14, 
1992 was to be the night of the perpetration of an assault or other 
harm against her estranged husband. 
However, when she was on the stand, Appellant testified she 
had never been to the Scoreboard, which is a local bar, but that 
she had been asked by several co-workers to join them at the 
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Scoreboard. (Tr. Trans., Vol. II, pp. 413-414). Appellant then 
testified: 
Q. (By Mr. Spafford): What happened on this day 
that made you decide to go? 
A. (By Appellant): Well, they'd been asking so 
much and pleading I decided to go. And since 
it was a Tuesday and Monday had been very slow 
I thought well, I'll be at work early and I can 
be home by midnight. 
Q. Now, did you have any conversations with anyone 
referencing your initiation to go to the Scoreboard? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. With whom did you have that conversation? 
A. With Hilary. 
Q. And when did you have that conversation? 
A. That morning. 
. . . . 
Q. What did you say? 
A. I said yeah, I'm going to go. This is the night. 
(Tr. Trans., Vol. II, pp. 414-415, lines 11-23, 9-10). 
Earlier in the trial, Ms. Melissa Scharrier had been called 
as a witness for the Appellant. She testified that in the few days 
immediately prior to the incident at the Peterson home on April 14-
15, 1992, she had overheard conversations at the Red Lobster 
between Appellant and Ms. Mlynar and between Ms. Mlynar and Mr. 
Soper. After the objection of the State, Appellant's counsel 
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proferred that if permitted, Ms. Scharrier would testify as 
follows: 
Your Honor, one of the issues in this case entirely is 
Allison's involvement and her knowledge, her attitude and 
her motive. It's our position that through this witness 
we can show the following conversations. One is that Kandi was 
pushing to get this done and Allison said no and therefore I 
think Kandi's initial statements as to let's get it done, I 
can do it, I can take care of it, is totally relevant and it is 
in direct rebuttal of what Kandi said. It goes to her credibility 
also. The fact that Allison don't, I'll handle it, is in direct 
refutation, once again, of Kandi1s testimony and everyone else's 
testimony. 
Next, the following conversation at the same approximate time 
is when Shane is saying, I don't want to do it and Kandi again is 
pushing Shane and makes the statement, Allison doesn't have to know 
everything. Now that goes—if I've never heard of anything that 
goes more directly to the issues and relevance and credibility of 
Kandi and motive than that. And I ask the Court to let it in. 
It's got to come in in fairness to the Defendant. 
Judge Young: All right. What is the state's position? 
Mr. Stott: I don't see how it fits the rules of evidence. 
Just because he wants it in it doesn't mean it fits the rules of 
evidence as an exception to the rules of evidence. Plus, we don't 
even know what they're referring to. 
Judge Young: That's my concern, I'll tell you, underlying 
concern is you don't even know if this relates to matters that 
were associated with their work. I'll take care of it at work. 
Mr. Gunnarson: Your Honor, if it please the Court, I will be 
happy to hold this testimony until Allison testifies about the 
initial conversation. 
Judge Young: Let me ask this witness. Do you know 
what they were talking about or do you believe that you concluded 
that after the incident occurred? 
The Witness: Not beyond a reasonable doubt can I 
honestly say that is exactly what they were talking about. 
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Judge Young: So you don't know what they were really 
talking about? 
The Witness: No, I don't. 
Judge Young: And you, after the event occurred, which 
was a few days later or some time later, then you drew the 
conclusion that they may have been talking about facts related to 
that event. 
The Witness: I knew they weren't talking about things at 
work. We never would take work that seriously to be—to have such 
a serious conversation occurring. They could have been talking 
about what they were going to do in the evening or anything else. 
Judge Young: All right. The objection will be sus-
tained and I will not allow the witness to testify on that. 
(Tr. Trans., Vol. II, pp. 383, lines 19 - p. 385, line 22). 
Following the remainder of Ms. Scharrier's testimony, after 
the Court ruled the bulk of it would be inadmissible, Ms. Paula 
Ring was called to testify as to a conversation she had overheard 
between Ms. Mlynar and Appellant. The Court instructed Ms. Ring 
that she could not testify as to anything Ms. Mlynar stated. (Tr. 
Trans. Vol. II, p. 394). Ms. Ring then testified that following 
Ms. Mlynarfs statements which were excluded from trial, she heard 
Appellant say "It was her problem and she could take care of it 
herself." (Id. p. 394, lines 24-25). 
The Utah Rules of Evidence hold that hearsay is a "statement, 
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c). However, the rule goes on to 
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state that "A statement is not hearsay if: the declarant testifies 
at trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning 
the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the 
declarant's testimony..." Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1). 
The evidence sought by Appellant to be introduced to the jury 
at trial by the testimony of Ms. Scharrier and Ms. Ring was that 
Ms. Mlynar had made prior statements inconsistent with her 
testimony at trial, and that the actual conversations between 
Appellant and Ms. Mlynar were, in reality, far different 
conversations than those introduced to the jury by Ms. Mlynarfs 
trial testimony. As such, the testimony of Ms. Scharrier and Ms. 
Ring did not involve hearsay, but did involve out of Court, non-
hearsay statements of Ms. Mlynar. The sole purpose of their 
introduction as proffered was to rebut, contradict, and impeach 
the credibility of the State's witness. The impact of the Court 
excluding this testimony contradicting Ms. Mlynar was to leave the 
jury with the very distinct impression that everything Ms. Mlynar 
testified to was true, and was without contradiction. 
As has been previously observed by the Utah Supreme Court, 
evidence which is incompetent for one purpose cannot be excluded 
if it is admissible as to another purpose. See Hill v. Hartog, 658 
P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah 1983). In State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635 
(Utah 1982), the Supreme Court ruled that a police report, offered 
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merely for impeachment of the victim's testimony, was not hearsay. 
Similarly, in prior cases, when testimony was offered of what an 
informant said to certain defendants, not to prove the truth of 
what was said, but only to show that the statement was made, the 
trial court's exclusion of the offered testimony was held to be in 
error. State v. Salman, 612 P.2d 366 (Utah 1980). 
In Apellant's case the offered testimony of Ms. Scharrier and 
Ms. Ring was not offered to prove that Appellant would take care 
of things herself, or that she wanted to take care of things 
herself. The offered testimony should have been allowed to be 
heard by the jury so that the jury would be aware that Ms. Mlynar's 
statements in mid-April of 1992 were far different from her 
testimony regarding those statements at trial. Offered for this 
impeachment purpose, the testimony of Ms. Scharier and Ms. Ring was 
excluded by the trial court in error. 
Appellant notes that the mere erroneous exclusion of evidence 
is usually harmless unless "the excluded evidence would probably 
have had a substantial influence in bringing about a different 
verdict or finding." Redev. Agcy. of Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 740 
P.2d 1296, 1303-04 (Utah 1987). It is Appellant's position on 
appeal that the trial court's erroneous exclusion of evidence 
impeaching the credibility of the State's witness, combined with 
the Court's demeanor towards and statements about Appellant and her 
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counsel during trial, served to devalue Appellant's credibility 
and capacity for honesty in the eyes of the jury, rendering 
Appellant's trial fundamentally unfair. 
POINT 3: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY 
PREJUDICED THE PROCEEDINGS BY ITS 
STATEMENTS AND CONDUCT. 
Appellant's trial was largely a trial of credibility. As a 
person charged as a "party to the offense", there was no question 
that Appellant did not actually burglarize the Peterson home on the 
night of April 14, 1992. Thus, the question of her guilt or 
innocence came down to the extent of her knowledge of, and 
participation in the planning and execution of the alleged 
burglary. In this respect, whose story the jury believed, the 
State's or the Appellant's, would be instrumental in the jury's 
eventual verdict. 
After excluding all possible third-party testimony as to the 
lack of consistency between Ms. Mlynar's in-court testimony and her 
actual statements in April of 1992, the trial court, through a 
series of statements, called into question not only Appellant's 
credibility, but also the competency of her trial counsel. 
On July 8, 1992, Appellant was called to testify in her own 
behalf on the second and last day of her trial. After being sworn 
and taking her seat, Mr. Spafford, Appellant's trial co-counsel, 
began asking Appellant a series of questions to demonstrate that 
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Appellant was taking the witness stand of her own free will/ and 
that she understood her constitutional protections against self-
incrimination and against testifying in her own behalf if she felt 
unwilling to so testify. Following Appellant's colliquoy with Mr. 
Spafford, the Court made the following statement and questions: 
Judge Young: Let me ask one other question 
because counsel may not find this is one 
that he might wish to ask, but that is, 
you're satisfied with your representa-
tion of counsel through these proceedings? 
You've had Mr. Spafford and Mr. Gunnarson and 
their representation of you. Your willingness 
to testify is independent of, but in conjunction 
with, discussions you've had with them; is that 
correct? 
The Witness: Yes, it is. 
Judge Young: You are satisfied with their repre-
sentation of you? 
The Witness: Yes, 1 am. 
(Tr. Trans., Vol. II, p. 405, lines 10-21) 
While seemingly innocuous, this questioning of Appellant 
regarding her perceptions regarding her counsel's competency would 
later be played upon by other statements of the Court. 
Following a few moments of testimony, Appellant turned to the 
trial court and began the following exchange: 
A. May I ask you something? 
Judge Young: No. 
The Witness: There's a person outside making 
faces at me. 
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Mr. Spafford: Your Honor, that appears to be Mr. 
Peterson. Can you ask the Bailiff to— 
Judge Young: We will take care of that. Go ahead. 
(Id. p. 411, lines 12-19). 
Following a good length of continuation of Appellant's 
testimony, the trial court interrupted the proceedings and made the 
following statements: 
Judge Young: Let me ask the Bailiff, will you 
see that nobody looks in the window like they're doing. 
Mr. Spafford: Thank you your Honor. 
Judge Young: Let me say this, that in relation to 
the earlier observations, I have been watching the 
window all day and I did not see any faces being made. 
I saw people looking and Mr. Peterson happened, by 
coincidence, to be there, so I've been watching it. 
It's directly in my line of sight and I did not see that. 
(Id., p. 425, lines 5-13). 
The combined effect of these separate occurrences was that 
after Appellant had complained that people were making faces at her 
through the courtroom door windows, and after Mr. Spafford observed 
that he saw Mr. Peterson looking in the windows immediately 
following Appellant's complaint, the court later interrupted and 
testified that he had been watching the windows all day and that, 
in effect, neither Appellant nor Mr. Spafford were to be believed. 
These irregular goings-on were culminated when the court 
interrupted the State's closing argument to caution Mr. Spafford 
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against making comments to co-counsel. (W., p. 579, lines 11-12), 
thus again calling to the jury's attention to the fact that there 
was some tension between the court and Appellant and her counsel. 
Only two months ago, when Appellant finally received a copy 
of the transcript in this matter, did the full impact of the trial 
court's attitude towards Mr. Spafford come to light when it was 
discovered that the Court had made a post-trial, sua sponte entry 
into the record to try and explain its statement to Mr. Spafford. 
Not relevant to the proceedings here, but still of note, is the 
fact that Mr. Spafford and Mr. Gunnarson both adamantly deny any 
statement such as that reported by the Court. However, more 
instructive is the obvious feelings the court had for Appellant's 
case and the taint those feelings gave the proceedings once 
Appellant was called to testify. The focus of Appellant's argument 
is not on what was said or not said, but on the overall effect the 
totality of the court's statements had on the jury. 
The standard by which the Court reviews the possible prejudice 
of the trial court's conduct is whether or not the trial court's 
conduct or comments were prejudicial to the rights of the Defendant 
and to the outcome of the trial. State v. Sanchez, 611 P.2d 721, 
722 (Utah 1980). 
In the Sanchez case, the trial court ordered defense counsel 
not to consult with a witness called by the prosecution after he 
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had testified and before the trial was over. Sanchez, supra, 611 
P.2d. at 727. In setting aside the Defendant's conviction and 
ordering a new trial, the Supreme Court stated: 
The Court should also be conscious of the 
fact that all concerned, including the parties, 
witnesses and jurors, look to him as the source 
of justice and the comments he makes and the 
attitude he conveys towards counsel and the trial 
may have an important effect thereon. 
On the basis of our discussion herein, we 
are not able to conclude with assurance the im-
propriety of procedure complained of did not 
have a substantial effect upon the trial. From 
this record we perceive no justification for the 
the Court's action. The effect thereof may well 
have been prejudicial. Wherefore, it is necessary 
the verdicts be set aside. 
Sanchez, supra, 611 P.2d at 727. 
Unlike the Sanchez case, the Court's comments and conduct in 
Appellant's trial were not merely a proscription against contacting 
witnesses, but rose to comments affecting the jury's sense of 
impartiality toward the credibility of Appellant and the competency 
of Appellant's counsel. Especially disturbing is the statement by 
Appellant to the Court that she saw someone making faces at her, 
followed within probably fifteen minutes by the Court's testimony 
that he had been watching the windows all day and had seen no one 
making faces when Appellant called his attention to it. The 
obvious message the Court's comments left the jury with was that 
Appellant was a liar. Where the crux of Appellant's defense rested 
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with the jury believing her testimony over that of the State's 
witnesses, this judicial evisceration of Appellant's credibility 
was clearly prejudicial. When combined with the exclusion of all 
other testimony contradicting Ms. Mlynar's presentation and 
testimony, the effect of the trial court's comments and attitude 
created a prejudicial circumstance wherein Appellant was prevented 
from a fair presentation of her case to the jury. The effect of 
the Court's statements is far more prejudicial than those in 
Sanchez. Appellant was prejudiced by the comments and conduct of 
the trial court, and should be retried after this Court sets aside 
the jury's tainted verdict. 
POINT 4: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN 
IT RELIED UPON AND CONSIDERED UNFOUNDED, 
UNSUBSTANTIATED EXTRAJUDICIAL SUBMISSIONS, 
IN SENTENCING APPELLANT. 
Following the conviction of Appellant of the charged offense 
of Aggravated Burglary, by jury verdict, Appellant came before the 
trial court on August 17, 1992 for sentencing. Prior to that time, 
the Utah Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, had 
compiled and submitted to the Court it's Pre-Sentence Report, as 
was ordered by the Court and as is now customary. However, after 
briefly reviewing the Pre-Sentence Report and having the 
opportunity to have counsel make a statement to the Court, followed 
by her own opportunity to make a statement to the Court, Appellant 
was rebuffed in her statements and pleas by the Court, who, relying 
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on information given to the trial court ex parte by Mr. Peterson, 
and relying on information contained in a Victim Impact Statement, 
berated Appellant as an abusive, violent, vindictive, cold, 
calculating person who would be sentenced to five years to life 
because of the things the Court had been told following conviction 
by Mr. Peterson. 
The Court made the following statements prior to imposing 
sentence in this matter: 
"In reports that I have received from the victim, 
Mr. Peterson has indicated that you have threatened 
him on prior occasions to this, that you once spiked his 
drink with medication and that you acknowledged that at 
the time that you were under medication. That's what 
he advised me of. That you attempted to hit him with 
your automobile on one occasion when they were deliveing 
the child to the child care home. That you did the same 
with his mother. 
(Sent. Tr., ["Sent. Tr."], p.13, lines 17-25). 
And maybe the fact that you spiked his soda with 
your medication at the time that you were taking Prozac, 
now takes on an enhanced view in his mind and he views 
it as a greater event than it perhaps was at the time 
that you did it. He indicated in his letter that he 
even went to the doctor and then discovered the problem 
with him was that you had been giving him medication. 
(Sent. Tr., p. 14, lines 7-13). 
I have not found evidence of abuse of you in the 
matters that have been before this Court. In fact, 
if anything, the one that has been abusive has been 
you. Your daughter has had a broken jaw, your daughter 
has had injuries to her face, the Division of Social 
Services has come forward and actively taken an interest, 
even placed your daughter in custody in foster care for 
a period of time, all associated with child abuse. And 
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that child abuse didn't come from Leon, it came from 
Allison. You know it and I know it. Now it's about 
time that you start to look at Allison and you say, 
what can I do to correct and cure Allison. 
(Sent. Tr., p. 15, lines 8-19). 
Each of these statements contained versions of facts which 
stood paramount in the Court's mind, and which were based upon 
hearsay statements and reports given to the Court, which were not 
made available to Appellant or her counsel, which were not 
reflective of trial testimony, which were not part of the trial 
record or proceedings, which were not subjected to the refinery of 
cross-examination as rebuttal, and which, Appellant believes, are 
false, and unfounded. 
The final issue Appellant thus raises on appeal is whether or 
not the trial court erred when it considered these hearsay, 
unfounded statements when sentencing Appellant. 
The Supreme Court has noted that although trial judges have 
substantial discretion in imposing sentences, that discretion is 
not unlimited, and may not be exercised on the basis of unreliable 
information. State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1985). The 
Court went on to say: 
The due process clause of Article I, Section 
7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a sen-
tencing judge act on reasonably reliable and 
relevant information in exercising discretion in 
fixing a sentence. Cf/ United States v. Bass, 
535 F.2d 110, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1976). To help 
effectuate that requirement, a Defendant must be 
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supplied a copy of his presentance report. State 
v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, (Utah 1982); State v. Lipsky, 
Utah, 608 P.2d 1241, 1245-49 (1980) (plurality 
opinion). 
"The decision to compel disclosure of presentence 
reports is not intended to impinge upon the sentencing 
judge's discretion in determining what punishment 
fits both the crime and the offender; rather, it acts 
only to shore up the soundness and reliability of 
the factual basis upon which the Judge must rely in 
the exercise of that discretion. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 
at 1249." 
Howell, 707 P.2d at 118. 
The weave of judicial soundness and due process which is 
contemplated by the compelled disclosure of the contents of Pre-
sentence Reports to defendants prior to their sentencing comes 
unraveled when the sentencing court takes into consideration extra-
judicial information supplied directly to the court, without 
disclosure to the defendant. 
Such is the reversible error presented to this Court for 
review. The underlying reasons and due process justifications of 
compelled disclosure of the contents of Pre-Sentence Reports were 
thwarted in Appellant's sentencing when the trial court relied, in 
such an obvious extent, on the extrajudicial, unfounded statements 
of Mr. Peterson when imposing sentence. This reliance on Mr. 
Peterson's letter and statements prevented Appellant from an 
effective presentation of exculpatary evidence during her 
sentencing hearing, and coming as its disclosure did, only after 
45 
all statements by Appellant and counsel had been made, even 
prevented Appellant from asking for another sentencing hearing to 
examine the statements of Mr. Peterson and to present evidence 
countering Mr. Peterson's assertions. 
The trial court's reliance on Mr. Peterson's extrajudicial 
statement in sentencing flies in the face of the Utah precedents 
holding that disclosure of the contents of pre-sentence reports is 
required. The requirements of disclosure will be valueless if 
trial judges are able to disclose the pre-sentence reports, and 
then rely upon undisclosed sources of information, without 
forewarning Defendants, and without affording defendants the 
opportunity to examine and test the efficacy and truth of the 
extrajudicial sources of information. The trial court abused its 
discretion in sentencing Appellant. Appellant's sentence should 
be overturned and remanded for further evidentiary proceedings. 
11. CONCLUSION 
The court erred in improperly instructing the jury and 
refusing to give appropriate lesser included offense instructions 
based upon the ambiguous evidence presented to the jury regarding 
whether or not entry occurred into Mr. Peterson's home. This error 
was compounded by the court's comments and instructions outside the 
trial regarding the difference between conspiracy and being a party 
to an offense. The combined effect of these jury instruction 
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errors deprived Appellant of the full measure of the reasonable 
doubt standard of proof and rendered the jury deliberations tainted 
and unfair. 
The court erred in excluding the testimony of Ms. Melissa 
Scharrier and Ms. Paula Ring, which was proffered for the sole 
purpose of impeaching the credibility of Ms. Kandi Mlynar. This 
testimony as proffered by Appellant should not have been excluded 
and should have been allowed to go to the jury to test Ms. Mlynarfs 
credibility. 
The court erred and prejudiced the proceedings when it 
effectively destroyed any credibility of Appellant in the eyes of 
the jury by stating that the comments made by both Appellant and 
her counsel regarding people outside the courtroom doors were 
false, because he had been watching the doors and had not seen 
anything that they had reported. These comments are additionally 
magnified by the other comments and statements made by the court 
which lessened the Appellant's stature or the credibility in the 
eyes of the jury. 
The court finally erred in considering the extra judicial 
statements of Mr. Peterson in sentencing Appellant and in not 
disclosing to Appellant nor her counsel that the court had received 
these extra judicial statements from Mr. Peterson. This prevented 
Appellant from effectively reviewing the information submitted to 
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the court and effectively countering any information she believed 
was false with evidentiary proof or by requesting an evidentiary 
hearing* This prejudiced the sentencing proceedings and rendered 
the sentence unfair and improper. 
For the reasons and based upon the facts and circumstances and 
arguments set forth herein, Appellant prays this court to vacate 
the jury verdict in the trial court, to reverse and overturn the 
trial court's judgment and sentence, and to remand this matter to 
the trial court for a, new trial. 
DATED this ^ — day of November, 1993. 
SPAFFORD & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C. 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
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vs. 
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D The motion of. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant haying been convicted toy^ a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of Q 4(M<U>^P<4/ £ k ^ 4 / t e ^ , a felony 
of the degree, Q a class misdemostnor, being now present m ea
represented by ^ g ^ i M ^ r * ^ , and the State being represented by rkJhrrj-
and ready for sentence and 
_ is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
years and which may be for life; D to a maximum mandatory term of 
D not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
j£ of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D. not to exceed years; 
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and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ \D\0OQ ^wctcardhasiy cf Q&Ob-^&r atefrl of- fyfi® 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
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D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
Q such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
* 
are hereby dismissed. 
' pflq 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
pi Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County^rfor delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
^Commi tment shall issue ^ p H i v s / r H l 
DATED this ££?, day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page _ ( of - j -
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Defense Counsel 
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ADDENDUM B 
EARL S. SPAFFORD (3051) 
CLARK A. HARMS (5713) 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
425 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-1234 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALLISON BRAVENEC PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 921900704FS 
Judge David S. Young 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT ALLISON PETERSON, by and through 
Earl S. Spafford and Clark A, Harms, her counsel of record 
herein, and hereby respectfully requests the following Jury 
Instructions, No. through No. be included in the 
instructions to be given the jury currently impanelled in this 
case. 
Three copies of these requested instructions are 
submitted herewith for the Court's use in assembling sets for 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 2 9 1992 
SALT LAKE COUNTY A ~s 
By K ^ 
'— * Q Deputy Ckrk 
jury room deliberations and for distribution to the parties. 
DATED this 29th day of June, 1992. 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
tEa±l S. Spafford 
Clark A. Harms 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that on the £-1 day of June, 1992, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS was hand-delivered to the following: 
Robert L. Stott 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
irk A. Harms ra
Attorney for Defendant 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the Defendant of the crime of 
Aggravated Burglary as charged in the Information, you must find 
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about April 15, 1992, in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, the defendant attempted, committed or fled from a burglary, 
or was a participant in a burglary and: 
a) caused bodily injury to any person who was not a 
participant in the crime; or 
b) used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous 
weapon against any person who was not a participant in the crime; 
or 
c) possessed or attempted to use any explosive or 
dangerous weapon. 
Burglary is defined as the unlawful entry into, or remaining 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent 
to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person. 
If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
State has proven each and every one of the above-mentioned 
elements, it is your duty to acquit the defendant. 
On the other hand, if the evidence has established at least 
one, but not each of said elements, then you consider whether the 
defendant is guilty of the lesser, but included offense of 
Attempted Aggravated Burglary, a Second Degree Felony; or whether 
the defendant is guilty of the lesser, but included offense of 
Burglary (involving a dwelling), a Second Degree Felony; or whether 
the defendant is guilty of the lesser, but included offense of 
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Attempted Burglary (involving a dwelling), a Third Degree Felony; 
or whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser, but included 
offense of Criminal Trespass (involving a dwelling); which may be 
either a Class B. misdemeanor or an infraction; or whether the 
defendant is guilty of the lesser, but included offense of 
Attempted Criminal Trespass (involving a dwelling), which is an 
infraction.2 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 et seq. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant of the lesser crime of 
Attempted Aggravated Burglary, a felony of the second degree, you 
must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, every one 
of the following essential elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about April 15, 1992, while in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, the defendant engaged in conduct which: 
a. constituted a substantial step toward the commission 
of the offense of Aggravated Burglary as such offense has been 
defined and explained to you in these instructions, and 
b. which conduct was strongly corroborative of the 
defendant's intent to commit said offense. 
If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
State has proven each and every one of the above-mentioned 
elements, it is your duty to acquit the defendant.7 
7
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 et seq. See State v. Harman, 712 
P.2d 291 (Utah 1986). 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant of the lesser crime of 
Burglary (involving a dwelling), a felony of the second degree, you 
must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, every one 
of the following essential elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about April 15, 1992, while in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, the defendant entered or unlawfully remained in a 
dwelling, or a portion of a dwelling. 
2. That the defendant entered or remained in such dwelling 
with the intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault 
on any person. 
If you believe that the evidence fails to establish each and 
all of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it is your duty to acquit the defendant. 
On the other hand, if the evidence has established at least 
one, but not all of the essential elements of this offense, then 
you may consider whether the defendant is guilty of Attempted 
Burglary (involving a dwelling), a Third Degree Felony; or whether 
the defendant is guilty of the lesser, but included offense of 
Criminal Trespass (involving a dwelling); which may be either a 
Class B. misdemeanor or an infraction; or whether the defendant is 
guilty of the lesser, but included offense of Attempted Criminal 
Trespass (involving a dwelling), which is an infraction.8 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 et seq. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant of the lesser crime of 
Attempted Burglary, a felony of the third degree, you must find 
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, every one of the 
following essential elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about April 15, 1992, while in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, the defendant engaged in conduct which: 
a. constituted a substantial step toward the commission 
of the offense of Burglary as such offense has been defined and 
explained to you in these instructions, and 
b. which conduct was strongly corroborative of the 
defendant's intent to commit said offense. 
If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
State has proven each and every one of the above-mentioned 
elements, it is your duty to acquit the defendant.9 
9
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 et seq. See State v. Harman, 712 
P.2d 291 (Utah 1986). ^ <* c ~ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant of the lesser crime of 
Criminal Trespass (involving a dwelling) which may either be a 
Class B. Misdemeanor or an infraction, you must find from the 
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, every one of the following 
essential elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about April 15, 1992, the defendant, while in 
Salt Lake County, Utah, under circumstances not amounting the 
Aggravated Burglary or Burglary, intruded with her entire body into 
a dwelling, or remained unlawfully within a dwelling and: 
(a) Intended to cause annoyance or injury to any person 
therein or damage to any property therein; or 
(b) Intended to commit any crime, other than theft or 
a felony; or 
(c) was reckless as to whether her presence would cause 
fear for the safety of another. 
This defines a Class B. Misdemeanor. 
OR 
2. That on or about April 15, 1992, the defendant, while in 
Salt Lake County, Utah, under circumstances not amounting to 
Aggravated Burglary or Burglary, knowing her entry or presence was 
unlawful, did enter or remain in a dwelling as to which notice 
against entering was given by: 
(a) Personal communication to the actor by the owner or 
someone with apparent authority to act for the owner; or 
(b) Fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to 
exclude intruders; or 
(c) Posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the 
OUuou 
attention of intruders. 
This defines an infraction. 
If you believe that the evidence fails to establish each and 
all of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it is your duty to acquit the defendant. 
On the other hand, if the evidence has established at least 
one, but not all of the essential elements of this offense, then 
you may consider whether the defendant is guilty of Attempted 
Criminal Trespass, which is an infraction.10 
10
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 . 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant of the lesser crime of 
Attempted Criminal Trespass, an infraction, you must find from the 
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, every one of the following 
essential elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about April 15, 1992, while in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, the defendant engaged in conduct which: 
a. constituted a substantial step toward the commission 
of the offense of Criminal Trespass as such offense has been 
defined and explained to you in these instructions, and 
b. which conduct was strongly corroborative of the 
defendant's intent to commit said offense. 
If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
State has proven each and every one of the above-mentioned 
elements, it is your duty to acquit the defendant.11 
11
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 et seq. See State v. Harman, 712 
P.2d 291 (Utah 1986). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one 
of your members to act as foreman or forewoman, who, as foreperson, 
will preside over your deliberations. 
Your verdict in this case must be as follows: 
1, As to the Count charged in the Information: 
(a) Guilty of Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree 
Felony; or 
(b) Not Guilty of Aggravated Burglary, but Guilty of the 
lesser included offense of Attempted Aggravated Burglary, a Second 
Degree Felony; or 
(c) Not Guilty of Aggravated Burglary, but Guilty of the 
lesser included offense of Burglary (involving a dwelling), a 
Second Degree Felony; or 
(d) Not Guilty of Aggravated Burglary, but Guilty of the 
lesser included offense of Attempted Burglary (involving a 
dwelling), a Third Degree Felony; or 
(e) Not Guilty of Aggravated Burglary, but Guilty of the 
lesser included offense of Criminal Trespass (involving a 
dwelling), which may be either a Class B. Misdemeanor or an 
Infraction; or 
(f) Not Guilty of Aggravated Burglary, but Guilty of the 
lesser included offense of Attempted Criminal Trespass (involving 
a dwelling), an Infraction; or 
(g) Not Guilty. 
m>^ n rt G ^ 
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all 
jurors is required to find a verdict. Your verdict must be in 
writing and the Court has provided you with forms covering all the 
possible verdicts so that when you find your verdict, it can be 
signed and dated by your foreperson for return to this Court, When 
your verdict has been found and signed, please notify the bailiff 
that you are ready to report to the Court. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah this day of July, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
HONORABLE DAVID S . YOUNG 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
ESS\Peterson\instruct.jur 
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AOOENDUM C 
INSTRUCTION NO, l4 
A person commits Aggravated Burglary if in attempting, 
:cmmitting, or fleeing from a burglary the person or another 
participant in the crime uses or threatens the immediate use of a 
iangerous or deadly weapon against any person who is not a 
participant in the crime, or is armed with a deadly weapon or 
assesses or attempts to use a deadly weapon. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. \b. 
Before you can convict the defendant, Allison Peterson, 
Df the crime of Aggravated Burglary, you must find from the 
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements 
of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 15th day of April, 1992, in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, the defendant, Allison Peterson, as a parry to 
the crime, entered or remained in rhe residence of Leon A* Peterson; 
2. That she, as a party to the crime, did so unlawfully, 
intentionally or knowingly or recklessly; 
3. That she, as a party to the crime, did so with the 
intent to commit a theft or an assault on Leon A. Peterson; 
>^ . Thar in attempting, committing, or fleeing from said 
burglary, she or another participant in the crime, either: 
(1) Used or threatened the immediate use of a 
dangerous or deadly weapon against Leon A. 
Peterson, not a participant in the crime; 
OR 
(2) Was armed with a deadly weapon or possessed 
or attempted to use a deadly weapon. 
If you find the State has proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt all of the above elements then it is your duty to convict the 
defendant. On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to so 
establish one or more of said elements, rhen you should find the 
defendant not guilty. 0 0 0 1 1 3 
INSTRUCTION NO, \^ 
Burglary is the unlawful entry into a building or any 
portion of a building with the intent to commit a theft or an 
assault on any person. 
000113 
INSTRUCTION N3. \7 
A person "eniers unlawfully" in or upon premises when the 
Dremises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry are nor 
:pen to the public and when tne person is not otherwise licensed or 
:rivileged ro enter upon the premises or such portion -hereof. 
"Enter" means intrusion of any part of the body or 
Intrusion of any physical object under the control of the actor. 
000121 
INSTRUCTION NO* 
Before you can convict the defendant of the lessor crime o£ 
Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Burglary,, a felony of: the second, 
degree, you must find from the evidencer beyond a reasonable doubts 
every one of the following essential elements of that crime t 
1. That on or about April 15, 1992, while in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, the defendant engaged in conduct: 
a. intending that conduct constituting Aggravated 
Burglary be performed or agreed with one or more persons to engage 
in conduct constituting Aggravated Burglary*, 
2» The elements of the crime of Aggravated' Burglary- haves 
previously been explained ta you and you are to use that previous^ 
definition of Aggravated Burglary in considering whether tbm 
evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is: 
guilty of^  Conspiracy^ to Commit.Aggravated Burglary* 
If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt tH&tmmm 
State has proven each and every one of the above-ment£!Si£Ki 
elements, it is your duty to acquit the defendant.15 
15
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 
INSTRUCTION NO. %&* 
When you: retire to consider your verdict, you will select 
one of your members to act as foreperson, who, as foreperson, 
will preside over your deliberations• 
Your verdict in this case must be either: 
Gtiilty of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a First Degree Felony, as 
charged in the Information; 
«£ 
GodDSt* bfl CONSPIRACY m COMMIT" AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a 
SfS39&d JBegree Felony* a lesserrl included offense of the 
X&ormatxonr 
or 
Not Guilty? 
SB yotir del liberations may determine.. 
This "being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all 
j.urors is required to find a verdict* Your verdict must be in 
writing, and when found, must be signed and dated by your 
foreperson and then returned by you to this court. When your 
verdict has been found, notify the bailiff that you are ready 
to report to the court• 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah y*™} "; t^Yl. 
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ADDENDUM D 
JUL 8«2. 
/C*ji*^ cx- &ey-yis<^&-<<A&&^^ 
/-> S\A± JUii^uZx^^A^^ 
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ADDENDUM E 
"Tw"rd Judicial C:«nSt 
JUL 8 1992 
UtfTY 
C£,^lVc^, c r K 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
THF STATF OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
AM TSON RRAVFNF PFTFRSON-
Defendant 
VERDICT 
Case No. 921900703 
We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find lb£..d.gf§Ma.n.tA 
..A].li.s0a..Br.a.v.en£..P.e.ter.SD.n., .Gu.i.l.t^ ...Qf..Aggr.a.v.a.te.d..B.ur.glar .^..a..£.i.ns.t...D£gr.efi.. 
X?.!?.ny.a...3.s..PM^ 
Dated l /. 19 :-l,P 
_— «- -~~*<:<rw. 
Foreperson 
000134 
ADDENDUM F 
76-2-202 CRIMINAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Utah's Statute Am. Jur . 2d. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes 
Permitting Limits on Corporate Directors' Lia- § 224. 
bility: A Guide for Lawyers and Directors, C.J.S. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 127. 
1988 Utah L. Rev. 847. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 1, 13. 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of 
offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of 
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-201, enacted by L* 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-201. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-202, enacted by L. 
1973, ch* 196, § 76-2-202. 
ANALYSIS 
Abortion. 
* Accomplice" defined. 
Aiding. 
Application. 
Arranging for the distribution of a controlled 
substance. 
Evidence. 
^Insufficient 
—Sufficient. 
Evidence of commission of crime at trial of ac-
cessory. 
Peace officers. 
Relation to former law. 
Cited. 
Abortion. 
In abortion prosecution, contention of defen-
dant that prosecutrix in voluntarily submit-
ting to abortion was an accomplice, and hence 
that he could not be convicted upon her testi-
mony was without merit; voluntarily commit-
ting abortion on one's self was a distinct of-
fense and not part of offense of performing 
abortion on another, and such person could not 
be convicted as an accomplice. State v. Cragun, 
85 Utah 149, 38 P.2d 1071 (1934). 
"Accomplice" defined. 
Under this section an "accomplice" is one 
who participates in a crime in such a way that 
he could be charged with the same offense as 
the principal defendant; one who, without 
using inducement or persuasion amounting to 
entrapment, provides only an opportunity to 
Cross-References. — Aiding violation of 
Wildlife Resources Code, § 23-20-23. 
Obstructing justice, § 76-8-306. 
commit a crime to one predisposed to do so, or 
one acting at the inducement of a peace officer 
trying to uncover violations of the law, does 
not come within this definition. State v. 
Cornish, 560 P.2d 1134 (Utah 1977). 
One given marijuana by defendant upon 
I promising to bring him money later but who 
never made payment was not an accomplice to 
offense of distribution of controlled substance. 
State v. Berg, 613 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1980). 
Aiding. 
Where entrance to store could have been 
gained only with outside help and defendant 
was seen looking into store when companion 
was inside and then was seen walking to rear 
of store where ladder was hidden, it was rea-
sonable to infer that defendant had aided and 
abetted in burgiary which made him a princi-
pal to the crime. State v. Johnson. 6 Utah 2d 
• 29, 305 P.2d 488 (1956). 
Defendant who drove codefendant to store 
that was robbed, waited in car with the engine 
running while codefendant entered store, and 
* drove codefendant to another car one block 
away after codefendant had allegedly killed 
L
* store owner was a "principal." State v. Mur-
phy, 26 Utah 2d 330, 489 P.2d 430 (1971). 
In prosecution for theft, instruction on aid-
 ing and abetting was prejudicially erroneous 
t where defendant was not charged with aiding 
 and abetting, there was no evidence of aiding 
t and abetting, and it was not proven that any 
 other person committed the crime. State v. 
 Pacheco, 27 Utah 2d 45, 492 P.2d 1347 11Q79V 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
INCHOATE OFFENSES 76-4-201 
76-4-102. Attempt — Classification of offenses. 
Criminal attempt to commit: 
(1) A capital felony is a felony of the first degree; 
(2) A felony of the first degree is a felony of the second degree; except 
that an attempt to commit child kidnaping, or to commit a violation of 
Section 76-5-301.1 or to commit any of those felonies described in Part 4 
of Chapter 5 of this title which are felonies of the first degree, is a felony 
of the first degree; 
(3) A felony of the second degree is a felony of the third degree; 
(4) A felony of the third degree is a class A misdemeanor; 
(5) A class A misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor; 
(6) A class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor; 
(7) A class C misdemeanor is punishable by a penalty not exceeding 
one half the penalty for a class C misdemeanor. 
History. C. 1953, 76-4-102, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-4-102; 1983, ch. 88, § 10. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 
1985); State v. Parkin, 742 P.2d 715 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal 
Law § 158. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 1208(7). 
PART 2 
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY 
76-4-201. Conspiracy — Elements of offense. 
For purposes of this part a person is guilty of conspiracy when he, intending 
that conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees with one or more 
persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct and any one of 
them commits an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy, except where the 
offense is a capital offense, a felony against the person, arson, burglary, or 
robbery, the overt act is not required for the commission of conspiracy. 
History: C. 1953, 76-4*201, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Bus, conspiracy to ob-
1973, ch. 198, § 76-4-201; 1974, ch. 32, § 8. struct operation of, § 76-10-1510. 
Conspiracy, pleading and proof, § 77-17-4. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 52 Am. Jur. 2d Malicious C.J.S. — 54 CJ.S. Malicious or Criminal 
Mischief § 1. Mischief or Damage to Property § 3. 
Key Numbers. — Malicious Mischief «=> 1. 
PART 2 
BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
76-6-201. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any water-
craft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted 
for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business 
therein and includes: 
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or 
vehicle; and 
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure 
or vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person 
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when 
the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining 
are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or 
privileged to enter or-remain on the premises or such portion thereof. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor. 
History: C. 1953. 76-6-201, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Civil provisions, 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-201. entry and detainer, $ 78-36-1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Burglary What is ftbuilding" or "house*1 within bur-
§ 1. glary or breaking and entering statute, 68 
C.J.S. — 12A C.J.S. Burglary § 2. A.L.R.4th 425. 
AXJL — Maintainability of burglary Key Numbers. — Burglary <s=» 1. 
charge, where entry into building is made with 
consent, 58 A.L.R.4th 335. 
76-6-202. Burglary-
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
150 
standing near a bedroom door. State v. John-
aon, 771 P.2d 1041 (1989). 
Intoxication* 
Since second degree burglary involved intent 
to commit larceny, if on account of voluntary 
intoxication accused did not have necessary in-
tent, jury should have taken into consideration 
evidence of intoxication in determining exis-
tence of such intent. State v. Hartley, 16 Utah 
Jd 123> 396 P.2d 749 (1964). 
Larceny and burglary-
One who entered garage with intent to steal, 
and stole automobile worth sufficient amount 
to make crime grand larceny, was properly 
convicted of both third degree burglary and 
grand larcency; since larceny was accom-
plished merely by taking personal property 
with intent to steal, the same facts did not con-
stitute burglary and larceny. Rogerson v. Har-
ris, 111 Utah 330, 178 P.2d 397 (1947). 
Where facts in criminal prosecution showed 
breaking and entering and larceny, and enter-
ing and larceny were independent, each offense 
required different acts, and defendnat was 
properly convicted of both burglary and lar-
ceny. State v, Jones, 13 Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d 
262 (1962). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Burglary 
§ 10. 
C.J.S. — 12A CJ.S. Burglary § 5. 
A.L.R. — Breaking and entering of inner 
door of building as burglary, 43 A.L.R.3d 1147. 
Criminal prosecution based upon breaking 
into or taking money or goods from vending 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-203, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-203; 1988, ch. 174, § 1; 
1989, ch. 170, § 6. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted 
"bodilv" for "physical" in Subsection (l)(a); 
Punishment. 
Legislature did not intend to repeal penalty 
provisions for burglary when it redefined the 
degrees of burglary in Laws 1969, Chapter 236, 
eliminating third degree burglary and redefin-
ing second degree burglary so as not to distin-
guish between nighttime and daytime burgla-
ries; the original penalty for second degree bur-
glary was not changed. Gonzales v. Morris, 610 
P.2d 1285 (Utah 1980). 
Separate buildings. 
Defendant committed two separate burgla-
ries where, within a 20-minute period, he 
broke into two separate buildings (a laundry 
room and an apartment) in an apartment com-
plex and stole money from both buildings. 
State v. Porter, 705 R2d 1174 (Utah 1985). 
Structures subject to burglary. 
Rabbit pens permanently constructed on de-
fendant's home premises were within kind of 
structures that could be burglarized under 
statute that included "outhouse, or other build-
ing" in structures subject to burglary. State v. 
Terrell, 55 Utah 314,186 P. 108,25 A.L.R. 497 
(1919). 
Cited in State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192 
(Utah 1985); State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 
(Utah 1987). 
machine or other coin-operated machine, 45 
AJJL3d 1286. 
Maintainability of burglary charge, where 
entry into building is made with consent, 58 
A.L.R.4th 335. 
Key Numbers. — Burglary <s=» 9(2). 
substituted "first degree felony" for "felony of 
the first degree" in Subsection (2); and made a 
minor stylistic change. 
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 
1989, substituted "dangerous weapon" for 
"dangerous or deadly weapon" in Subsection 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
76-6-203. Aggravated burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, 
or fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the 
crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against 
any person who is not a participant in the crime: or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon. (2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as 
under Section 76-1-601. 
153 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AUBL — Right of independent expert to re- Rignt of indigent defendant in state cnminai 
fuse to testify as to expert opinion. 50 case to assistance of chemist, coxxcoiogist. tecn-
A.IJFL4th 680. moan, narcotics expert, or similar nonmedical 
Right of indigent defendant in state cnminai specialist in substance analysis. 74 AJ-»JL4th 
case to assistance of expert in social attitudes. 388 
74 AJLR.4th 330. 
ARTICLE Vffi. 
HEARSAY. 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A ''statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement-
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay'' is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the 
thai or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony or 
the witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) 
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or 
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influ-
ence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after 
perceiving him; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered 
against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual 
or a representative capacity, or iB) a statement of which he has mani-
fested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a 
person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the sub-
ject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter 
within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the exis-
tence of the relationship, or lE) a statement by a coconspirator of a 
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Suosection sistent or «2) the witness has forgotten, and 
(a) is in accord with Ruie 62(1), Utan Rules 01 does not reauire the onor statement to have 
Evidence (1971). been given unaer oath or suoiect to perjury. 
Subsection ib) is in accoro with Ruie 62(2). The former Utah ruies admitted sucn state-
Utah Rules of Evidence 1L971). The hearsav ments as an exceouon to the hearsay ruie. See 
ruie is not appiicaole in declarations 01 devices California v. Green. 399 U.S. 149 (1970), with 
and machines, e.g., radar. The definition of resoect to conirontation prooiems unaer the 
"hearsay' in subdivision c) is suDstantiaily Sixtn Amendment to the United States Gonsta-
the same as Rule 63. Utan Ruies of Evidence tution. Subdivision td)(l) is as ongmally pro-
(1971). muigatea by the U HI tea States Supreme Court 
Subdivision (d)(1) is similar to Ruie 63(1), with the addition of the language "or the wit-
Utah Ruies of Evidence t1971). It deviates from ness denies having made the statement or has 
the federal ruie in that it allows use ot pnor forgotten' and is in keening with the pnor 
statements as suostantive evidence if (1) mcon- Utan ruie and the actual effect on most junes. 
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